This paper presents a simple framework for Horn clause abduction, with probabilities associated with hypotheses. It is shown how this representation can represent any probabilistic knowledge representable in a Bayesian belief network. The main contributions are in fi nding a relationship between logical and prob abilistic notions of evidential reasoning. This can be used as a basis for a new way to implement Bayesian Networks that allows for approximations to the value of the posterior probabilities, and also points to a way that Bayesian networks can be extended beyond a propositional language.
1

Introduction
In this paper we pursue the idea of having a log ical language that allows for a pool of possible hy potheses Poole, 1988] , with prob abilities associated with the hypotheses [Neufeld and Poole, 1987] . We choose a very simple logical lan guage with a number of assumptions on the structure of the knowledge base and independence amongst hy potheses. This is intended to reflect a compromise between simplicity to implement and representational adequacy. To show that these assumptions are not un reasonable, and to demonstrate representational ade quacy, we show how arbitrary Bayesian networks can be represented by the formalism. The main contribu tions of this embedding are:
• It shows a relationship between logical and prob abilistic notions of evidential reasoning. In par ticular it provides some evidence for the use of abduction and assumption-based reasoning as the logical analogue of the independence of Bayesian Networks. In earlier work ] a form of assumption-based reasoning where we abduce to causes and then makes assumptions in order to predict what should follow is devel oped; it is a similar mechanism that is used here to characterise Bayesian networks.
• It gives a different way to implement Bayesian networks1. The main advantage of this implemen tation is that it gives a way to approximate the probability with a known error bound.
• Because the underlying language is not proposi tional, it gives us a way to extend Bayesian net works to a richer language. This corresponds to a form of dynamic construction of Bayesian net works [Horsch and .
In [Poole, 1991] , it is argued that the probabilistic Horn abduction framework provides a good compro mise between representational and heuristic adequacy for diagnostic tasks. It showed how the use of variables can be used to extend the purely propositional diag nostic frameworks, and how the use of probabilities can be naturally used to advantage in logical approaches to diagnosis.
2
Probabilistic Horn Abduction
Horn clause abduction
The formulation of abduction used is a simplified form of Theorist Poole, 1988] . It is sim plified in being restricted to Horn clauses.
Although the idea [Neufeld and is not restricted to Horn clauses (we could extend it to dis junction and classical negation or to negation as failure [Eshghi and Kowalski, 1989] ), in order to empirically test the framework, it is impor tant to fi nd where the simplest representations fail. It may be the case that we need the extra represen tational power of more general logics; we can only demonstrate this by doing without the extra repre sentational power.
We use the normal Prolog defi nition of an atomic sym-Poole hoi [Lloyd, 1987] . A Horn clause is of the form: H is a set of atoms, called the "assumables" or the "possible hypotheses". Associated with each as sumable is a prior probability.
Here (and in our implementation) we write assumabl e(h, p ) .
where h is a (possibly open) atom, and p is a number 0 � p � 1 to mean that for every ground instance h(} of h, hB E H and P(hB) = p.
Definition 2.1 Poole, 1988] If g is a ground formula, an explanation of g from (F, H) is a subset D of H such that
The fi rst condition says that, D is a sufficient cause for obs, and the second says that D is possible (i.e., F U D is consistent). A minimal explanation of g is an explanation of g such that no strict subset is an explanation of g.
Probabilities
Associated with each possible hypothesis is a prior probability. The aim is to compute the posterior prob ability of the minimal explanations given the observa tions. Abduction gives us what we want to compute the probability of and probability theory gives a mea sure over the explanations [Neufeld and Poole, 1987] .
To compute the posterior probability of an explanation D = { h1, ... , hn} of observation obs given observation obs, we use Bayes rule and the fact that P(obs!D) = 1 2Notice that we are using Horn clauses differently from how Prolog uses Horn clauses. In Prolog, the database con sists of definite clauses, and the queries provide the neg ative clauses [Lloyd, 1987] . Here the database consists of definite and negative clauses, and we build a constructive proof of an observation.
as the explanation logically implies the observation:
The value, P( obs) is the prior probability of the ob servation, and is a constant factor for all explanations. We compute the prior probability of the conjunction of the hypotheses using:
The value of P(h1 /1. ... /1. hn-d forms a recursive call, with P(true) = 1. The only other thing that we need to compute is If hn is inconsistent with the other hypotheses, then the above conditional probability is zero. These are the cases that are removed by the inconsistency re quirement. If hn is implied by the other hypotheses, the probability should be one. This case never arises for minimal explanations.
While any method can be used to compute this condi tional probability, we assume that the logical depen dencies impose the only statistical dependencies on the hypotheses.
Assumption 2.2 Logically independent instances of hypotheses are probabi/istically independent. Definition 2.3 A set D of hypotheses are logically independent (given F) if there is no S C D and h E D\S such that F U S F h or F U S F ..,h
The assumptions in a minimal explanation are always logically independent.
Under assumption 2.2, if {hi, ... , hn} are part of a min imal explanation, then thus n P(h! /1. ... /1. hn) II P(h;)
1=1
To compute the prior of the minimal explanation we multiply the priors of the hypotheses. The posterior probability of the explanation is proportional to this.
The justifi cation for the reasonableness (and univer sality) of this assumption is based on Reichenbach's principle of the common cause:
"If coincidences of two events A and B oc cur more frequently than their independent occurrence, ... then there exists a common cause for these events ... " [Reichenbach, 1956, p. 163] .
When there is a dependency amongst hypotheses, we invent a new hypothesis to explain that dependence. Thus the assumption of independence, while it gives a restriction on the knowledge bases that are legal, really gives no restriction on the domains that can be represented.
Relations between explanations
The remaining problem in the probabilistic analysis is in determining the value of P( obs).
When using abduction we often assume that the diag noses are covering. This can be a valid assumption if we have anticipated all eventualities, and the observa tions are within the domain of the expected observa tions (usually if this assumption is violated there are no explanations). This is also supported by recent at tempts at a completion semantics for abduction [Poole, 1988; Console et a/., 1989; Konolige, 1991] . The results
show how abduction can be considered as deduction on the "closure" of the knowledge base that includes statements that the given causes are the only causes. The closure implies the observation are logically equiv alent to the disjunct of its explanations. We make this assumption explicit here:
The diagnoses are covering.
For the probabilistic calculation we make an additional assumption:
Assumption 2.5 The diagnoses are disjoint (mutu ally exclusive).
It turns out to be straight forward to ensure that these properties hold, for observations that we can anticipate3. We make sure that the rules for each possible subgoal are disjoint and covering. This can be done locally for each atom that may be part of an observation or used to explain an observation.
''Vhen building the knowledge base, we use the local property that the rules for a subgoal are exclusive and covering to ensure that the explanations generated are exclusive and covering.
Under these assumptions, if { e 1, ... , en} is the set of all explanations of g:
3Like other systems (e.g., [Pearl, 1988b) ), we have to assume that unanticipated observations are irrelevant. 
Representing Bayesian networks
In this section we give the relationship between Bayesian networks and our probabilistic Horn abduc tion. We show how any probabilistic knowledge that can be represented in a Bayesian network, can be rep resented in our formalism.
Suppose we have a Bayesian network with random variables a1, ... , an, such that random variable a; can have values v; , 1, ... , v;, n,. We represent random vari able a; having value Vi ,j as the proposition a;( Vi,j ).
The first thing we need to do is to state that the values of variables are mutually exclusive. For each i and for each j, k such that j =P k, we have the rule false <--a;( v;,j) 1\ a;( vi,k) A Bayesian network [Pearl, 1988b] is a directed acyclic network where the nodes represent random variables, and the arcs represent a directly influencing relation.
An arc from variable b to variable a represents the fact that variable b directly influences variable a; the rela tion influences is the transitive closure of the directly influences relation. Terminal nodes of a Bayesian net work are those variables that do not influence any other variables. The depth of a node is the length of the longest (directed) path leading into the node.
A composite belief [Pearl, 1987] is an assignment of a value to every random variable.
Suppose variable a is directly influenced by variables lla = b1, ... , bm (the "parents" of a) in a Bayesian net work. The independence assumption embedded in a Bayesian Network [Pearl, 1988b] is given by P(ailla 1\ v) = P(allla) where v is a variable (or conjunction of variables) such that a does not influence v (or any conjunct in v).
The network is represented by a rule that relates a variable with its parents:
The intended interpretation ofc..a(V, V1, ... , Vm) is that a has value V because b1 has value V1, ... , and bm has value Vm.
Associated with the Bayesian network is a contingency table which gives the marginal probabilities of the val ues of a depending on the values of b1, ... , bm. This will consist of probabilities of the form P(a = vibl =vJ, ... ,bm=vm)=p This is translated into the assertion assumable(c_a (v, v1, v2, . . . , vm), p).
Nodes with no parents can be just made assumable, with the appropriate probabilities (rather than invent ing a new hypothesis and the above procedure would prescribe). Example 3.1 Consider a representation of the influ ence diagram of figure 3.1, with the following condi tional probability distributions: 
Composite Beliefs
A composite belief [Pearl, 1987] is an assignment of a value to every random variable. The composite be lief with the highest probability has also been called a MAP assignment [Charniak and Shimony, 1990] . These composite beliefs have been most used for di agnosis [de Kleer and Williams, 1987; de Kleer and Williams, 1989; Peng and Reggia, 1990 ] (see [Poole and Provan, 1990 ] for a discussion on the appropriate ness of this).
Lemma 3.2 The minimal explanations of the termi nal variables having particular values correspond to the composite beliefs in the Bayesian network with the ter minals having those values. The priors for the expla nations and the composite beliefs are identical.
The proof of this lemma and for lemma 3.4 appears in appendix A.
As the same procedure can be used to get from the pri ors of composite hypotheses and explanations to the posteriors given some observations, the following the orem is a direct corollary of lemma 3.2.
Theorem 3.3 If the observed variables include all terminal variables, the composite beliefs with the ob served variables having particular values correspond exactly to the explanations of the observations, and with the same posterior probability.
If the observed variables do not include all terminal values, we need to decide what it is that we want the probability of [Poole and Provan, 1990 
Posterior Probabilities of Propositions
In the previous section, the observations to be ex plained corresponded exactly to the conditioning vari ables. This corresponds to the use of "abduction" in . In this section we show a relationship to the combination of abducing to causes and default rea soning to predictions from these causes .
Let expl( a) be the set of minimal explanations of proposition (or conjunction) a.
If H is a set of assignments to variables in a Bayesian Network, and H' is the analogous propo sitions to H in the corresponding probabilistic Horn abduction system, then
A simple corollary of the above lemma can be used to determine the posterior probability of a hypothesis based on some observations:
The denominator can be obtained by finding the ex planations of the observations. The numerators can be obtained by explaining Xi( vi) from these explanations. 
Best-first abduction
We are currently experimenting with a number of im plementations based on Logic programming technol ogy or on ATMS technology. These are implemented by a branch and bound search where we consider the partial explanation with the least cost (highest prob ability) at any time.
The implementations keep a priority queue of sets of hypotheses that could be extended into explanations ("partial explanations"). At any time the set of all the explanations is the set of already generated explana tions, plus those explanations that can be generated from the partial explanations in the priority queue.
Formalll, a partial explanation is a pair
where g is an atom, C is a conjunction of atoms and D is a set of hypotheses.
Initially the priority queue to explain a contains {( a <-a, {}), (false <-false, {} ) } We thus try simultaneously try to find explanations of a and "explanations" of false (forming nogoods in ATMS terminology) that can be used to prune other partial explanations.
At each step we choose the element (g <-C, D)
of the priority queue with maximum prior probability of D, but when partial explanations are equal we have a preference for explanations of false.
We have an explanation when Cis the empty conjunc tion. Otherwise, suppose C is conjunction a/\ R.
There are two operations that can be carried out. The first is a form of SLD resolution [Lloyd, 1987] , where for each rule a <-b1 /\ ... /\ bn in F, we generate the partial explanation
The second operation is used when a E H. In this case we produce the partial explanation
This procedure, under reasonable assumptions, will find the explanations in order of liklihood.
4Here we give only the bare-bones of the goal-directed procedure; there is an analogous bottom-up procedure that we are also experimenting with. The analysis is similar for that procedure. We also only give the propositional version here. The lifting to the 11 eneral case by the use of substitutions is straightforward LLloyd, 1987] .
It turns out to be straight forward to give an upper bound on the probability mass in the priority queue.
If (g <-C, D) is in the priority queue, then it can possi bly be used to generate explanations D1, ... , Dn. Each D; will be of the form DUn;. We can place a bound on the probability mass of all of the D;, by
This means that we can put an bound on the range of probabilities of an goal based on fi nding just some of the explanations of the goal. Suppose we have goal g, and we have generated explanations 1J. Let
where Q is the priority queue.
We then have
P(D)
As the computation progresses, the probability mass in the queue PQ approaches zero and we get a better refinements on the value of P(g). This thus forms the basis of an "anytime" algorithm for Bayesian networks.
5
Causation
There have been problems associated with logical for mulations of causation [Pearl, 1988a] . There has been claims that Bayes networks provide the right indepen dencies for causation [Pearl, 1988b] . This paper pro vides evidence that abducing to causes and making assumptions as to what to predict from those assump tions ] is the right logical ana logue of the independence in Bayesian networks (based on theorem 3.5).
One of the problems in causal reasoning that Bayesian networks overcome [Pearl, 1988b] is in preventing rea soning such as "if c1 is a cause for a and c2 is a cause for -.a, then from c1 we can infer c2 " . This is the prob lem that occurs in the Yale shooting problem [Hanks and McDermott, 1987] . Our embedding says that this does not occur in Bayesian networks as c1 and c2 must already be stated to be disjoint. We must have al ready disambiguated what occurs when they are both true. If we represent the Yale shooting scenario so that the rules for "alive" are disjoint the problem does not anse.
6
Comparison with Other Systems
The closest work to that reported here is by Char niak and Shimony [Charniak and Shimony, 1990; . Theorem 3.3 is anal ogous to Theorem 1 of . Instead of considering abduction, they consider models that consist of an assignment of values to each random variable. The label of [Shimony and plays an analogous role to our hypotheses. They how ever, do not use their system for computing posterior probabilities. It is also not so obvious how to extend their formalism to more powerful logics.
This work is also closely related to recent embeddings of Dempster-Shafer in ATMS [Laskey and Lehner, 1989; Provan, 1989] . One difference between our em bedding of Bayes networks and Dempster Shafer is in the independence assumptions used. Dempster-Shafer assume that different rules are independent. We as sume they are exclusive. Another difference is that these embeddings do not do evidential reasoning (by doing abduction), determining probability of hypothe ses given evidence, but rather determine the "belief" of propositions from forward chaining.
The ATMS-based implementation is very similar to that of de Kleer and Williams [1987; . They are computing something different to us (the most likely composite hypotheses), and are thus able to do an A* search. It is not clear that including the "irrelevant" hypotheses gives the advantages that would seem to arise from using an A* search.
7
Conclusion
This paper presented a simple but powerful mecha nism for combining logical and probabilistic reasoning and showed how it can be used to represent Bayesian Networks.
Given the simple specifi cation of what we want to com pute, we are currently investigating different imple mentation techniques to determine which works best in practice. This includes using logic programming tech nology and also ATMS technology. We are also trying to the representational adequacy by building applica tions (particularly in diagnosis, but also in recogni tion), and based on this technology.
It may seem as though there is something terribly ad hoc about probabilistic Horn abduction ( c.f. the ex tensional systems of [Pearl, 1988b] ). It seems, how ever, that all of the sensible (where L j M ( ai( Vi,j)) = 1 for each random variable ai) representations (propo sitionally at least) correspond to Bayesian networks. The natural representation tends to emphasise propo sitional dependencies (e.g., where b is an important distinction when a is true, but not otherwise). These are normal Bayesian networks, but imply more struc ture on the contingency tables than are normally con sidered special. Proof: This is proven by induction on a well founded ordering over sets of hypotheses. This ordering is based on the lexicographic ordering of pairs (h, n) where h is the depth of the element of the set with maximal depth, and n is the number of elements of this depth. Each time through the recursion either h is red need or h is kept the same and n is reduced. This is well founded as both h and n are non-negative integers and n is bounded by the number of random variables.
For the base case, where h = 1, we have all of the hy potheses are independent and there is only one trivial explanation. In this case we have
P(H) = M(H') = II P(h) heH
For the inductive case, suppose a(v) is a proposition in H with greatest depth. Let R = H\a(v). Under the ordering above lla U R < H, and so we can assume the lemma for n. U R. Note also that a does not influence anything in R (else something in R would have greater depth than a).
P(H) P(a = v 1\ R) = P(a =viR) x P(R) ( � P(allla 1\ R) x P(TiaiR)) x P(R) = LP(ailla) X P(TiaiR) X P(R) n.
L P(ailla) x P(lla 1\ R) 
